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(Mis)appropriation Art: Transformation and Attribution in the Fair
Use Doctrine
JOHN CARL ZWISLER∗

ABSTRACT
Since the adoption of transformation by the Supreme Court, judicial
decisions have continued to expand the fair use doctrine. Relying on
transformation has led judges to subjectively critique and analyze artwork
in order to make a legal decision. However, while a majority of circuits apply
transformation, it is not followed by all of them. Transformation should no
longer be a requirement in a fair use analysis concerning appropriation art,
because it first requires subjective interpretation of an artist’s work.
Transformation also gives an advantage to artists appropriating the work,
claiming fair use of another’s copyrighted work. Instead, the emphasis
should be on the overall effect on the market for the original work by the
secondary use, with special consideration given to how attribution to the
original author aids in the fair use test.

∗ B.M., 2010, Berklee College of Music; J.D. candidate, 2016, Northeastern University School of
Law. I would like to thank Professor Kara Swanson, Ph.D., for her support and comments on early
versions of this Note as well as Nathanael Karl Harrison, Ph.D., for our many discussions on the subject.
I would also like to thank my parents, Yashira Agosto, and Nicholas Fede for their comments and support
during the writing of this Note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
You are invited to attend the new exhibit of a well-known artist at one
of the most famous galleries in New York City. Weaving your way through
celebrities and critics, you notice a piece that looks very familiar. Upon
closer inspection, you realize the artist has based the work on a photograph
you took several years ago, but the photo has been slightly manipulated.
Your name is not mentioned anywhere, and you never gave the artist
permission to use your work. Frustrated with what you consider
an objectionable use, you want to prevent the artist from further exploiting
your creative work.1 However, after consulting with copyright counsel, you
learn that your ability to vindicate your rights under federal copyright law
depends on where you file a lawsuit. As interpreted in the Second and Ninth
Circuits, the fair use doctrine may allow the artist to easily convince a judge
that the copying was necessary for his or her own creative vision, and you
may be left without a remedy.
Fair use is an affirmative defense, allowing the use of a copyrighted
work to not constitute infringement.2 When analyzing a fair use defense,
courts must look to four statutory factors to determine whether the
defendant’s taking of the copyright holder’s work qualifies as a fair use: 1)
the purpose and character of the use; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.3

1. While the aforementioned is meant to be a hypothetical example, it is comparable to the events
surrounding Richard Prince’s New Portraits exhibit. Prince commented on others’ Instagram pictures,
took screenshots of them, and placed them on canvas. New Portraits was featured at the Gagosian Gallery
in New York City in September and October of 2014. GAGOSIAN GALLERY,
http://www.gagosian.com/exhibitions/richard-prince—september-19-2014. Since then, the works have
sold for upwards of $90,000 per piece. Jessica Contrera, A Reminder That Your Instagram Photos Aren’t
Really Yours: Someone Else Can Sell Them for $90,000, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 25, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2015/05/25/a-reminder-that-your-instagramphotos-arent-really-yours-someone-else-can-sell-them-for-90000/. Donald Graham, a photographer,
learned one of his photos was used in the exhibit and sent Prince and the Gagosian Gallery cease and
desist letters. Hrag Vartanian, Photographer Sends Cease and Desist Letters to Richard Prince and
Gagosian, HYPERALLERGIC (Feb. 15, 2015), http://hyperallergic.com/183036/photographer-sends-ceaseand-desist-letters-to-richard-prince-and-gagosian/. Donald Graham’s Rastafarian Smoking a Joint,
Jamaica was uploaded to Instagram by a third party and Prince used the photo as the basis of one of his
New Portraits without permission or attributing Graham. Id. Graham has since filed suit against Prince
and the Gagosian claiming copyright infringement. Eileen Kinsella, Outraged Photographer Sues
Gagosian Gallery and Richard Prince for Copyright Infringement (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://news.artnet.com/market/donald-graham-sues-gagosian-richard-prince-401498. Prince could
potentially face several additional actions for his use of copyrighted images in New Portraits.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
3. Id.
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Twenty years ago, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme
Court clarified the “purpose and character of the use” factor, stating that
courts should determine if the new work is “transformative” of the original
work.4 The Court held that judges should look to whether the new work adds
something to the first work, or alters it with a new meaning or message.5
Such a task requires judges to subjectively interpret the meaning of both
works at issue. If a court determines the new work is transformative, that
would weigh heavily in favor of fair use.
This precedent has been interpreted differently among the circuits, and
has led to much confusion. Specifically, in the world of appropriation art, the
focus on transformation requires judges to rely on their personal views on
art to determine if and how a work has been sufficiently transformed into a
new work. As a result, many plaintiffs rely on judges who likely do not have
substantial training in the fine arts. Additionally, it is counter to the words
penned by Justice Holmes over a century ago: “It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.”6 As a result of the transformation test, judges are
forced to ignore this warning when deciding art appropriation cases.
Appropriation artists use others’ work to create their own works. The
prior works can be in the public domain, or protected under copyright law.
Appropriation artists often take another’s material, and manipulate it by
changing color, size, and orientation7 or may simply enlarge the size of an
existing photograph.8 Only some of these early artists were consciously
aware of the legal recourse they might face.9

4. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
5. Id.
6. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
7. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (creating the work “Niagara” by using
a photograph from a high fashion magazine and “includ[ing] in the painting only the legs and feet from
the photograph but “invert[ing] . . . the orientation of the legs so that they dangle vertically downward
above the other elements of ‘Niagara’ rather than slant upward at a 45-degree angle as they appear in the
photograph” and “add[ing] a heel to one of the feet and modify[ing] the photograph’s coloring”).
8. See, e.g., Richard Prince, Untitled (Cowboy), 1980.
9. Laura Gilbert, Comment, No Longer Appropriate?, THE ART NEWSPAPER, 235 (May 2012),
http://old.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No%20longer%20appropriate?/26378 (last visited March 28,
2015). A pioneer of appropriation art, Sherry Levine, stated, “She made it clear that piracy, with its
overtones of infringement and lack of authorisation, was the point.” Id.
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One of the most popular appropriation artists is Jeff Koons.10 His works
are widely known, and include pieces such as an inflatable Incredible Hulk,11
a giant stainless steel Popeye,12 and paintings using images from famous
magazines.13 While Koons has held exhibitions all over the world and gained
significant popularity, his success has not allowed him to avoid major
copyright litigation.14 In one such dispute, a French advertisement designer
named Franck Davidovici claimed that Koons’ sculpture, Fait d’Hiver,
1988,15 was a copy of the photograph and advertisement he created for the
clothing company Naf Naf.16
The advertisement, entitled Fait d’Hiver, was created in 1985 and
featured a woman laying on her back with a pig at the top of her head,
sporting a rum barrel around its neck.17 Koons created four identical
sculptures in 1988, each depicting a woman laying on her back with a pig at
the top of her head.18 However, Koons’ sculptures differ from Davidovici’s
advertisement in that they include a penguin and its chick and depicts the pig
wearing a lei with the rum barrel and the woman wearing a mesh top that
exposes her breasts.19 Davidovici’s lawyer confirmed that legal action was

10. Jeff Koons was born in Pennsylvania in 1955, studied at the Maryland Institute College of Art
and received a BFA in 1976. His artwork has been featured in galleries and institutions around the world,
including the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, the Neue National Galerie in Berlin, and the
Pompidou Center in Paris. Biography, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/biography-summary (last
visited Jan. 2, 2015).
11. Artwork, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/artwork/hulk-elvis/hulk-friends (last visited April
28, 2015).
12. Artwork, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/artwork/popeye/popeye-0 (last visited Jan. 2,
2015).
13. Artwork, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/artwork/easyfun-ethereal/niagara (last visited April
28, 2015).
14. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1992); United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
15. See infra Figure 2.
16. Alexander Forbes, Jeff Koons Sued for Plagiarism, ARTNET NEWS (Dec. 18, 2014),
http://news.artnet.com/market/jeff-koons-sued-for-plagiarism-201510 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
Davidocivi’s lawyer confirmed that “a ‘legal action’ was underway” but did not specify the nature of the
action. Id. A case filing has not been locatable. A similar case has been filed in the United States. See
Henri Neuendorf, Jeff Koons Sued Yet Again Over Copyright Infringement (December 15, 2015),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/jeff-koons-sued-copyright-infringement-392667 (last visited Jan. 14,
2016). A photographer claims his photograph, which was used in a 1986 advertisement, was used as the
basis for a work by Jeff Koons. Id. This Note does not explore this case.
17. See infra Figure 2.
18. Forbes, supra note 16.
19. Id.

6 ZWISLER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

(MIS)APPROPRIATION ART

1/29/16 3:02 PM

167

underway in France, even though the sculpture was removed from display at
the Centre Pompidou in Paris at the request of its owners.20
In past litigation, when facing a copyright infringement claim, Koons
asserted the fair use defense.21 Although Koons prevailed in only one of these
cases,22 a more recent decision coming from the Second Circuit has expanded
the breadth of fair use.23 This could lead to an increased likelihood of
successful assertions of the fair use defense for Koons and other
appropriation artists, because the court in Cariou v. Prince held that artists
do not need to explain the meaning of the work they create,24 thus easing the
burden of proof for an appropriation artist.
In Cariou v. Prince, another well-known appropriation artist, Richard
Prince, was able to partially avoid liability for copyright infringement by
asserting a fair use defense.25 In that case, the Second Circuit held that a new
work need not comment on the original work to be considered fair use.26
Therefore, the transformative nature of Prince’s work alone was sufficient
for twenty-five of the thirty challenged works to be deemed fair use.27 This
expansion of the transformative test further muddied the already confusing
test the Supreme Court adopted just over twenty years ago.
In the landmark case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the rap group
2 Live Crew was accused of copying Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” in
the creation of their song “Pretty Woman.”28 2 Live Crew argued that despite
the commercial nature of the song, it was a parody, and should be considered
fair use.29 The Court dismissed the notion that the commercial nature of a
new work alone was per se infringement, and clarified the fair use analysis
by stating that transformation occurs when the new work “adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.”30 It also heavily focused on the

20. Alexander Forbes, Jeff Koons Plagiarism Lawsuit Could Top Millions, ARTNET NEWS (January
19, 2015), http://news.artnet.com/market/jeff-koons-plagiarism-lawsuit-could-top-millions-225200 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2015).
21. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d
Cir. 1992); United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
22. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259.
23. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
24. Id. at 698.
25. Id. at 698–99.
26. Id. at 698.
27. Id. at 698–99.
28. 510 U.S. 572, 572 (1994).
29. Id. at 574.
30. Id. at 574.
30. Id. at 579, 583.
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transformative nature of the potentially infringing work, and stated that “the
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors.”31
In Cariou, the Second Circuit expanded “the purpose and character of
the use” factor and granted a major victory for appropriation artists.
However, the rationale the court used has not been adopted across all the
circuits, because the Seventh and Ninth Circuits interpret the four statutory
factors in the context of appropriation art differently.32 Since the Campbell
decision, the lower courts have struggled to determine what exactly makes a
work transformative. As a result, judges act as art critics and add their
subjective interpretation to the meaning of the copyrighted work and
potentially infringing work, which the Supreme Court cautioned against over
a century ago.33
The Supreme Court in Campbell erred in adopting the transformative
test, because it led to widespread subjective interpretation of art among the
lower courts and major uncertainty in fair use cases. Doing away with the
transformative test and shifting the focus back to the other statutory factors,
with an emphasis on the fourth factor—the effect the taking had on the
potential market of the original work—will remove the mandate that judges
make subjective interpretations of artistic works. Additionally, an
appropriation artist who attributes his or her reliance on a copyrighted work
to the original artist should be able to argue that the positive effect on the
market for the original was, in part, due to the attention the appropriation
artist brought to the original artist’s work. Focusing on the fourth statutory
factor will also allow plaintiffs to bring infringement actions without fear of
a subjective judicial decision and allow appropriation artists to make more
compelling arguments when considering market effect.
This Note will use Davidovici v. Koons34 to explain the fair use doctrine
and will illustrate the circuit split regarding that theory. This Note will also
explain the problems with the transformative test and will provide a solution
that will increase consistency among appropriation art cases. Part II will then
discuss a history of the fair use defense, tracing its origins from a focus on
supplanting the market of the original work to where it lies today. Part II will
also explain how transformation currently usurps the four statutory factors.

31. Id.
32. See Kieintz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.,
725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
33. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
34. Forbes, supra note 16. While a filing regarding this dispute has not been locatable, this Note
will refer to the dispute as Davidocivi v. Koons.
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Part III will then describe appropriation art and its case history and will
illustrate the wide variety of arguments that artists can make under the
expanded fair use test. Part IV will address how different courts would
analyze and decide Davidovici v. Koons, based on the respective tests each
circuit employs. By doing so, this Note illustrates the circuit split and will
show how artists do not enjoy uniform relief among federal circuits. Part V
will then provide a solution to the fair use problem—eliminating the
transformative test and replacing it with a more straightforward statutory
interpretation by focusing on the fourth factor. Additionally, Part V will
consider how attribution to the original copyright owner might influence the
fair use analysis. Finally, Part VI will conclude with asking the Supreme
Court to eliminate the circuit split by instructing lower courts regarding
proper fair use analysis.
II. A HISTORY OF FAIR USE
A. Supplanting the Market of the Original Work
The common law doctrine of fair use did not develop from judges
interpreting the works at issue, but rather focused on whether the new work
would act as a substitute in the market for the original work. The first
example of the fair use doctrine involved a dispute between a biography
entitled Life of Washington and a previously published encyclopedia, both
based on the writings of President George Washington.35 Justice Story wrote
that when the original and allegedly infringing works are compared, the court
should answer the question of copying by relying on a
nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the
other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects
of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed
to have resorted to the same common sources of information.36

The court’s primary concern was that the new work would prove to be a
replacement for the original and that “[i]f so much is taken that, the value of
the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are
substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient,
in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.”37 Utilizing this framework,
the court found the biography infringed the encyclopedia38 and laid the basic
underpinnings of what the fair use doctrine would later become.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
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B. The Codification of Fair Use
Congress codified a version of the fair use doctrine in the 1976
Copyright Act.39 The Act established fair use as an affirmative defense to a
claim of copyright infringement, and lists several purposes in which fair use
can be used as a defense. The fair use defense could be used for the following
types of works: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship,
or research.40 In addition, the statute included four factors that need to be
balanced in a fair use analysis: (1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted works as
a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.41
Congress intended each factor to weigh equally in the fair use analysis,
and that each case needed to be decided upon its own set of facts.42 While no
factor was meant to be dispositive, courts heavily focused on the fourth
factor before 1994, to the point that the Supreme Court called it
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”43 Fair use
jurisprudence would retain this bias toward the fourth factor until the rise of
the transformation sub-factor.
C. Toward a Fair Use Standard and the Rise of Transformation
Considering the prevalence of the transformation consideration in the
modern fair use analysis, its presence is conspicuously absent from the 1976
Copyright Act. Therefore, its rise can be partially attributed to an influential
law review article penned by Judge Pierre Leval, which changed the way the
fair use doctrine is applied.44 In Toward a Fair Use Standard, Judge Leval

39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
40. Id.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4) (2012).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (finding that because circumstances in copyright cases
can be so diverse, bright line rules are not as helpful as case-by-case analysis); see also Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (stating that all four statutory factors “are to be explored,
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”).
43. Harper & Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
44. Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual
Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. 12 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 92, 99–101 (2014) (“While the [Supreme] Court did not accept transformative use as
necessary to a fair use . . . it was nonetheless regarded as highly auspicious in the new analytical scheme
Campbell created. . . . Despite its legal murkiness, the transformative use doctrine gradually became
central to fair use determination in many lower courts.”) (emphasis in original).
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argued for a shift away from the contemporary application of the fair use
statute, and towards a focus on whether the allegedly infringing work is
transformative.45 Judge Leval suggested that the purpose of fair use is to
comply with the main objective of copyright protection: to stimulate the
production of creative works to benefit society.46 In order to achieve this
objective, Judge Leval posited that courts should determine whether the new
work is transformative of the original work by adding a different character
with a new expression, meaning, or message.47 Judge Leval believed that
transformative works would further the underpinnings of copyright law, as
well as the copyright clause of the Constitution.48 However, Judge Leval was
concerned that extensive borrowings would prohibit creative incentives.49
Therefore, the justification for the appropriation could be outweighed “if the
takings are excessive and other factors favor the copyright owner.”50 Despite
the caution from Judge Leval, the Campbell court endorsed the
transformation consideration and allowed it to eventually dominate the fair
use test.
D. The Supreme Court Errs in Expanding Fair Use
In 1989, Luther Campbell of the rap group 2 Live Crew wrote the song
“Pretty Woman,” a parody of Roy Orbison’s famed “Oh, Pretty Woman.”51
The parody heavily drew from Orbison’s work, and when faced with a claim
of copyright infringement, 2 Live Crew argued a fair use defense.52 The case
is important for a variety of reasons, the most notable of which was the
emphasis the Supreme Court chose to place on Judge Leval’s article.53 While
the Court stated that a finding of transformative use is not absolutely
necessary for a finding of fair use, it also held that the goal of copyright is
furthered by the creation of transformative works.54 Therefore, “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors.”55 Additionally, as if to reinforce the displacement of market harm

45.
46.
47.
48.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.1105, 1111 (1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1107–08.
Id. at 1112.
Id.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
Id. at 573.
Id. at 579–94.
Id. at 579.
Id.
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as the primary fair use consideration, Justice Souter added that when “the
second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and
market harm may not be so readily inferred.”56
The Campbell Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in stopping its
analysis after concluding the commercial nature of “Pretty Woman”
rendered it unfair, and remanded the case to analyze transformation using
Judge Leval’s ideas.57 In doing so, the Court changed the way lower courts
interpreted the fair use defense by shifting the test away from the fourth
factor and towards determining how transformative the new work is of the
original work. Lower courts have zealously adopted Judge Leval’s
transformation consideration. In a study of fair use cases from 2006 to 2010,
the data showed that the “fair use doctrine today is overwhelmingly
dominated by the Leval-Campbell transformative use doctrine.”58 As two
scholars put it, “[u]nfortunately, in the ensuing two decades, the ambiguity
surrounding the [fair use] doctrine has, if anything, increased.”59 This has led
to a wide variety of different rationales in opinions, causing uncertainty in
fair use decisions.60 This doctrinal murkiness61 eventually found its way into
the realm of appropriation art.
III. APPROPRIATION ART AND CASE LAW HISTORY
A. Appropriation Art Primer
Appropriation art refers to the act of reusing existing elements to create
a new work.62 The term operates under a number of technical definitions,
but the most relevant to this discussion is “[t]he use of pre-existing objects
or images with little transformation.”63 Appropriation artists “believe that in
borrowing existing imagery or elements of imagery, they are recontextualizing . . . the original imagery, allowing the viewer to renegotiate
56. Id. at 591.
57. Id. at 594.
58. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 736
(2011).
59. Bunker & Calvert, supra note 44, at 95.
60. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156
U. OF PA. L. REV. 549 (2008).
61. Bunker & Calvert, supra note 44, at 95.
62. Hayley A. Rowe, Appropriation in Contemporary Art, 3 STUDENTPULSE 06 (2011),
http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/546/appropriation-in-contemporary-art.
63. IAN CHILVERS & JOHN GLAVES-SMITH, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY
ART
27
(2nd
ed.
2008)
(emphasis
added);
see
also
Appropriation,
TATE,
http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-resources/glossary/a/appropriation (“Appropriation in art and art
history refers to the practice of artists using pre-existing objects or images in their art with little
transformation of the original.”).
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the meaning of the original in a different, more relevant, or more current
context.”64
Appropriation artists have argued that a change in medium65 or context,
such as a display in a gallery, can be transformative even if the actual work
is not altered.66 This has led to the appropriation artist movement being
dubbed as “the most radical challenge to the copyright laws to date.”67 While
appropriation artists test the boundaries of copyright law, this has not stopped
artists such as Jeff Koons from continuing to appropriate previous works to
create their own.
B. Pre-Campbell: Parody Versus Satire
Koons is no stranger to copyright infringement claims. While he has
been a part of several lawsuits, his most infamous case involves a picture of
a litter of puppies and a sculpture. In 1989, Art Rogers, a professional
photographer, brought a copyright infringement action against Koons,
alleging that Koons’ String of Puppies68 infringed a commissioned
photograph69 Rogers had taken years earlier of an acquaintance’s puppies.70
Rodgers was convinced the photo would not work on its own, so he asked
the owner and his wife to hold the eight puppies for the photograph.71 After
Rogers’ photograph was licensed, it was also produced and distributed as a
notecard beginning in 1984.72 Koons purchased the card in 1987 and
demonstrated it to his team of artisans as what he envisioned for his new
work; he wanted the sculpture to be “copied faithfully” from the photograph
and for the work to “be just like the photo.”73 In the subsequent copyright
infringement suit, Koons asserted a fair use defense, but the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Rogers.74
64. Rowe, supra note 62, at 1.
65. John Koegel & Barton Beebe, Article: The Interview: John Koegel & Barton Beebe, 4 N.Y.U.J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 183, 189–90 (2014). John Koegel, Jeff Koon’s counsel in the Rogers case
stated, “I argued that a mere change in medium was sufficient to exempt a work from being infringing.”
Id. However, he did go on to note, “changing medium should be significant, but not absolute.” Id.
66. Kim Landsman, Cariou v. Prince Confirms Importance of Transformativeness, LAW360 (May
1,
2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/437497/cariou-v-prince-confirms-importance-oftransformativeness.
67. Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-Modernism, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1992).
68. See infra Figure 4.
69. See infra Figure 5.
70. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 305.
74. Id. at 305–06.
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In affirming the lower court’s summary judgment motion, the Second
Circuit conducted its own fair use analysis.75 Because this case preceded the
Supreme Court ruling in Campbell, the Second Circuit did not address the
transformative nature of the allegedly infringing work. Instead, the court
focused heavily on whether Koons’ work was a parody or satire, because
Koons claimed that String of Puppies was a “fair social criticism.”76
The court found that String of Puppies was a “satirical critique of our
materialistic society” but was unable to find any parody of the photograph
itself.77 It also held that for a work to be a parody, the “copied work must be,
at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to
conjure up the original work.”78 The court held that String of Puppies was a
social commentary as a whole but found no parody of the original
photograph. Therefore, there was no need to conjure up the original
photograph, resulting in the first factor weighing against a finding of fair
use.79 The court then analyzed the remaining three factors, and found that all
three factors weighed against a finding of fair use.80 The court found that
Rogers’ work was a creative original expression subject to broad copyright
protection and that Koons copied the essence of the photograph and
incorporated the expression of the work Rogers created.81 Because Koons
only produced the work to sell it as high-priced art, the likelihood of future
harm to Rogers was presumed.82
Koons was unable to mount a winning fair use defense, because his new
work did not comment on or parody the original in any way. Koons would
again face a copyright infringement action almost twenty years later when
he compiled and used images from advertisements to create another work.
However, this case followed the Campbell decision. With the new precedent
set in a fair use analysis, Koons was able to change his strategy, focus on
how his new work added a new meaning and message different from the
original, and persuade the court that his work was transformative.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 308–12.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310–12.
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 312.
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C. Post-Campbell: Adopting Transformation
By the mid 2000’s, Koons was a litigation veteran. However, the
Campbell decision turned the tide in favor of appropriation artists, such as
Koons. As a result, Koons, with help from his counsel, was able to change
his defense by tailoring arguments to the change in the law.83
Andrea Blanch was an accomplished professional fashion photographer
whose work appeared in numerous magazines, including Vogue and
Allure.84 Blanch took a photograph depicting a woman’s legs and feet
wearing Gucci sandals resting in a man’s lap.85 The photograph, entitled
“Silk Sandals,” was published in Allure magazine as part of a six-page
feature on metallic cosmetics.86
Deutsche Bank commissioned Koons to create an art exhibition in
collaboration with the Guggenheim Museum. For the exhibition, Koons
created a collection of works entitled “Easyfun-Ethereal.”87 In creating
“Easyfun-Ethereal,” Koons gathered images from advertisements, scanned
them, and digitally superimposed the images against backgrounds of pastoral
landscapes.88 Among the images Koons used to create his work “Niagara,”89
he used Blanch’s “Silk Sandals.”90 Koons incorporated only the legs and feet
from the photograph, inverted the orientation of the legs, the number of pairs
of legs used, and modified the photograph’s coloring.91 Blanch brought an
action against Koons, claiming that “Niagara” infringed her copyright to
“Silk Sandals.”92
The Second Circuit, in affirming the lower court’s summary judgment
motion in favor of Koons, analyzed the fair use defense and the
transformative nature of “Niagara.” The court had already accepted the
reasoning in Campbell, and as a result, was well-versed in applying the
transformation test.93 To do so, the court determined whether “Niagara’s”

83. Koegel & Beebe, supra note 65, at 189. John Koegel, Jeff Koons’ attorney, stated, “I was trying
to get the judge to understand [Koons]’s artistic expression as something that ought to be within the safe
harbor that [Sony and Harper Row] provided. Transformation was not a factor or consideration in Rogers.
Transformation wasn’t part of the lexicon. That did not come until later, until Campbell.” Id.
84. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2004).
85. Id. at 248.
86. Id.; see infra Figure 5.
87. Blanch, 467 F.3d, at 247.
88. Id.
89. See infra Figure 6.
90. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247–48.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 249.
93. Id. at 251.
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use of “Silk Sandals” was transformative, or whether “Niagara” “merely
supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.”94 However, this determination required
the court to consider the meaning of each work, and therefore, to make
subjective judgments of the two artists’ intent in creating their works.
Koons wisely argued use of different mediums or other technical
details, but also structured his defense upon the fact that his purpose in
creating “Niagara” was in stark contrast with Blanch’s goal in creating “Silk
Sandals.”95 The court agreed, finding that Koons used Blanch’s image to
comment on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. This
different use of the image “confirms the transformative nature of the use.”96
The court went on to say that the transformative test “almost perfectly
describes Koons’s adaptation of ‘Silk Sandals,’”97 and unsurprisingly, that
Koons’ use of “Silk Sandals” was transformative. 98 The court further noted
that Koons justified taking the “Silk Sandals” photograph.99 In doing so, the
court concluded that Koons had “a genuine creative rationale for borrowing
Blanch’s image,” based entirely on Koons’ own word:
I considered them to be necessary for inclusion in my painting rather than
legs I might have photographed myself. The ubiquity of the photograph is
central to my message. The photograph is typical of a certain style of mass
communication. . . . I thus comment upon the culture and attitudes
promoted and embodied in Allure Magazine.100

After finding the new work transformative, the court then gave less weight
to the other statutory factors.
Addressing the second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” the
court concluded that although Blanch’s work was a creative expression close
to the core of copyright protection, its weight in the fair use balance was
diminished when the creative work of art was being used for a transformative

94. Id. at 253 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
95. Id. at 252. Koons stated that he wanted the viewer “to think about his/her personal experience
with these objects, products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our
lives.” Id. Comparatively, Blanch stated, “I wanted to show some sort of erotic sense.” Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 253 (“[T]he use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American
‘lifestyles’ magazine—with changes of its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the
medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details and, crucially, their entirely different purpose
and meaning—as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery
space.”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 255.
100. Id.

6 ZWISLER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

(MIS)APPROPRIATION ART

1/29/16 3:02 PM

177

purpose.101 Therefore, it did not matter that the second factor weighed in
favor of Blanch.
The court also held in favor of Koons with regards to the third factor,
“the amount and substantiality of the portion used,” finding that Koons’
appropriation to be reasonable, in light of his purpose for copying. Because
Koons used only the legs from the photograph, the court determined that he
only copied what was “necessary to evoke a certain style of mass
communication,” and the court found the third factor to weigh in Koons’
favor.102 Finally, the court found the fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon
the potential market,” to weigh in favor of Koons, because Blanch had not
published or licensed “Silk Sandals” in any other publication but Allure.
Blanch further admitted that “Niagara” had not upset any plans she had for
the photograph, or for future ones.103 In light of those admissions, the court
found no deleterious effect on the potential market value for “Silk
Sandals.”104
As a result of the intervening Campbell case, the Second Circuit gave
significant weight to the transformative nature of “Niagara,” and did not
emphasize the other three statutory factors. However, this approach to fair
use was not limited to Blanch alone. A more recent decision involving
another appropriation artist, Richard Prince, took the focus of transformation
one step further. This time, the Second Circuit, in Cariou v. Prince, further
expanded the precedent set forth in Campbell, which many appropriations
artists found to be a major victory.105 However, not everyone believes the
decision benefited the artistic community, because artists will no longer have
to take responsibility for their work.106

101. Id. at 257.
102. Id. at 258.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Nicholas O’Donnell, No Infringement in Cariou v. Prince-Second Circuit Plays Art Critic and
Finds Fair Use, ART LAW REPORT (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.artlawreport.com/2013/04/25/noinfringement-in-cariou-v-prince-second-circuit-plays-critic-and-finds-fair-use/.
106. Nathanael Karl Harrison, Appropriation Art and U.S. Intellectual Property Law Since 1976,
121–22 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the University of California, San Diego,
library system) (“[W]hile the artist may have prevailed in the short-term, the long-term impact the
[Cariou] court ruling will have on artistic practices is concerning—not from the standpoint of legal
viability, but rather because the appeals court decision works toward absolving artists of the need to
critically question the images, objects and texts they appropriate. I want to insist on the idea of the artist’s,
if not legal, then ethical responsibility towards the images he or she uses.”).
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D. Transformation Usurps the Four Statutory Factors
In 2013, the Second Circuit once again decided a copyright
infringement case involving an appropriation artist and further expanded the
fair use defense. The court’s holding in Cariou v. Prince focused on the
transformative nature of the allegedly infringing work, and expanded the
exceptions to the exclusive rights of a copyright by holding that “the law
does not require that a secondary use comment on the original artist or work,
or popular culture.”107
Patrick Cariou is a professional photographer who lived among
Rastafarians in Jamaica for six years during the 1990’s.108 He developed a
significant relationship with the Rastafarians, and as a result, they allowed
him to take portraits and landscape photographs. Cariou compiled these
photographs, and published them in a book entitled “Yes Rasta.”109 The book
enjoyed limited commercial success, earning Cariou only $8,000 from book
sales. Except for a handful of private sales, Cariou never sold or licensed
individual photographs.110
Richard Prince, an already established appropriation artist, came across
a copy of “Yes Rasta” in 2005 at a bookshop.111 Between 2007 and 2008,
Prince held a show in St. Barth’s that included 35 photographs torn out of
“Yes Rasta” that were manipulated in various ways, including painting
lozenges over the subjects’ faces.112
Prince acquired three additional copies of “Yes Rasta” and went on to
create an additional thirty works in what became known as the “Canal Zone”
series.113 The portions used from “Yes Rasta” vary from piece to piece, but
in some of the “Canal Zone” pieces, Prince did as little as “paint blue
lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste a picture of a guitar
over the subject’s body.”114
The Gagosian gallery in New York City held a show between
November and December 2008 that included 22 works from Prince’s “Canal
Zone” series.115 Prior to this show, a gallery owner named Christiane Celle
contacted Cariou about a potential exhibit in New York City for “Yes
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 699.
Id.; see infra Figure 7.
Cariou, 714 F.3d, at 699.
Id.
Id.; see infra, Figure 8.
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 703.
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Rasta.”116 The two communicated back and forth discussing terms, but when
Celle learned of Prince’s show at the Gagosian, she mistakenly concluded
that Cariou was working with Prince and “decided that she would not put on
a ‘Rasta show’ because it had been ‘done already.’”117 When Cariou learned
of the show at the Gagosian in December 2008, he sued Prince for copyright
infringement.118
At the trial level, the court rejected Prince’s summary judgment motion,
asserting a fair use defense concluding, “Prince did not intend to comment
on Cariou’s Photos, or on aspects of popular culture.”119 The Second Circuit
held that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying
Prince’s summary judgment motion, and clarified the correct standard,
opining that instead of “confining our inquiry to Prince’s explanations of his
artworks . . . The focus of our infringement analysis is primarily on the Prince
artworks themselves.”120 Subsequently, the court concluded that twenty-five
of the thirty works from the “Canal Zone” series were transformative as a
matter of law.121
The circuit court reached its decision by first discussing the Leval
article and the Campbell decision, stressing that a transformative work need
not comment on the author or the original work. However, the transformative
work must still provide a “new expression, meaning, or message.”122 The
court went on to state that when transformative use is at issue, courts must
examine works to determine how they “may reasonably be perceived in order
to assess their transformative nature.”123 The court compared the “Yes Rasta”
and “Canal Zone” images side by side and concluded that Prince had not
presented the same material as Cariou.124 Instead, Prince added something
new with a different aesthetic.125 Cariou produced serene and deliberately
composed photographs, while Prince’s “crude and jarring works, on the
other hand, are hectic and provocative.”126 Justice Holmes’ words from his
Bleistein opinion seemed to be forgotten by this panel; the judges interpreted
the meaning of an artist’s work in order to make legal judgments.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
Id.
Id. at 706 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707–08.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 706.
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As a result of the transformative nature of Prince’s works, the court
gave significantly less weight to the fact that the works were for commercial
purposes, that Cariou’s work was a creative published expression, and
determined that Prince only took the amount necessary to “fulfill its
transformative purpose.”127 Additionally, the court stated that Prince’s work
did not dilute the potential market value for Cariou’s photographs, as
“Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s . . . [his] work appeals to
an entirely different sort of collector than Cariou’s.”128 While Prince’s work
attracted well-known celebrities, artists, and professional athletes, Cariou
had not “actively marketed his work or sold work for significant sums.”129
With this in mind, the court held that Prince’s work did not usurp the market
of “Yes Rasta.”130
The Second Circuit has continued to expand the fair use doctrine from
Rogers to Cariou. In Rogers, the court concluded that Koons commented on
society as a whole and not the original work.131 Therefore, fair use was not
valid defense.132 In Cariou, the court concluded new works did not need to
comment on the original and that the court should decide whether the use
was transformative.133 This determination would occur by deciding how the
new work would be “reasonably perceived.”134 This shift in the fair use
analysis can be traced back to the intervening Campbell case. The precedent
the case establishes makes it substantially easier for appropriation artists to
argue a work is transformative, while directing courts to give significantly
less weight to the remaining statutory factors.135 Finally, this excessive focus
on the transformative nature of a secondary work requires judges to interpret
and critique art, which Justice Holmes cautioned against long before
Campbell.136 While this may be the established precedent in the Second
Circuit, at least one other circuit is not following suit.137

127. Id. at 710.
128. Id. at 709.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
132. Id. at 310–12.
133. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698.
134. Id. at 707.
135. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2004).
136. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
137. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 2015 U.S.
LEXIS 1921 (2015).
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IV. THE FAIR USE PROBLEM ACROSS THE CIRCUITS
A. Introduction
As the preceding sections have illustrated, the Supreme Court’s focus
on transformation has led the lower courts to interpret the doctrine in ways
that have expanded fair use. However, the Seventh Circuit has refused to
analyze the transformation sub-factor entirely. This has led to a split among
the circuits, which the Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to
resolve.138
This section will analyze how three different circuits would interpret
Davidovici v. Koons, based on the leading fair use case in each circuit.
B. The Second Circuit and Fair Use; The Transformative Test
Applying the rationale of Cariou to the facts of Davidovici, it is likely
the Second Circuit would find fair use. The heavy reliance on the
transformation of the new work, and the fact that Koons’ work need not
comment on the original Naf Naf advertisement tips the scale in favor of fair
use.
To begin, the court would look at the two works side by side to
determine how Koons’ work would be reasonably perceived and conclude
that the sculpture has a different character, gives Davidovici’s photograph a
new expression, and employs new aesthetics distinct from Davidovici’s.139
Koons’ addition of a lei on the pig and the two penguins are notable
differences, but a justice might find the most persuasive difference to be the
see through top the woman wears.
Just as the court concluded that Cariou’s photographs were “serene and
deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs,”140 it would
come to a similar conclusion looking at Davidovici’s photograph. The
Second Circuit would describe the photograph as a woman laying peacefully
in the snow with a contemplative gaze. Also, because the Cariou court
concluded, Prince’s works were “crude and jarring” and “hectic and
provocative,”141 it would also conclude that Koons’ work is similarly
138. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1921 (2015) (holding that Kienitz’s
photograph of the mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, was appropriated by defendant Sconnie Nation on
commercial t-shirts in order to criticize the mayor’s attempt to shut down an annual block party); Kienitz,
766 F.3d, at 757, 758–59 (deciding not to follow Cariou and instead determining the copying was fair
use).
139. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707–08.
140. Id. at 706.
141. Id.
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provocative, because the sculpture depicts a nearly identical looking woman
with her breasts exposed. The court would see Koons’ statue as it was
described in the original exhibit catalog for his “Banality” series, “a Walt
Disney version of an erotic fantasy.”142 This would lead the court to the
conclusion that Koons’ work has a different character, and therefore, is
transformative. The first factor would be decided based on the aesthetic
findings of the judges— persons who likely have no training in the fine arts,
yet are compelled to make these findings as a result of the transformative
test.
The Cariou court did not find that the commercial nature of Prince’s
work was a factor that substantially weighed against a finding of fair use.143
It would do the same in this instance, as “[t]he more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism.”144 Similarly, the court would give less weight to the other
statutory factors as well.
Turning to the next statutory factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the court would find that Davidovici’s photograph is a work worthy of
copyright protection. However, just as the court found with the commercial
nature of the work, this factor “may be of limited usefulness where . . . [a]
creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.”145
The Cariou court determined that Prince had not taken more than
necessary from the original photographs, and it would reach the same
conclusion here. The court would conclude that Koons needed to “conjure
up at least enough of the original to fulfill its transformative purpose,”146 and
create a new distinct work. In finding that this factor weighed heavily in
Prince’s favor, the Cariou court stated he “transformed those photographs
into something new and different.”147 Similarly, the court would find Koons
only took what was necessary to conjure up the original and created
something new. The main components of Davidocivi’s photograph were the
woman in the snow and the pig above her head.148 The court would conclude
that in order to conjure up enough of the original, Koons needed to include
these components in his sculpture. Moreover, Koons added differences, such

142. Luke Malone, Jeff Koons Sued for Ripping Off Artists-Again, VOCATIV (Dec. 17, 2014)
http://www.vocativ.com/culture/art-culture/jeff-koons-copyright-infringement-naf/.
143. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706.
144. Id. at 708.
145. Id. at 710 (internal quotations omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See infra Figure 1.
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as the mesh top the woman wears and the lei around the pig, in order to create
something new.
The court would then look to any effect on the potential market for
Davidovici’s photograph. Currently, there is no information about any lost
profits or licenses Davidovici incurred. If he suffered any lost profits or
licenses, it would be wise to argue them fiercely, in order to persuade the
court of a non-fair use. However, because the Second Circuit has called the
first factor “[t]he heart of a fair use inquiry,”149 it would assign significant
weight to the transformation of the new work, and less weight would be
given to the market effect factor. This would ultimately lead to a finding in
favor of Koons and fair use.
C. The Ninth Circuit and Fair Use; The Transformative Test
A similar rationale would be used in the Ninth Circuit, as it follows the
precedent set forth in Campbell. In Seltzer v. Green Day, the Ninth Circuit
was tasked with determining whether the use of an artist’s drawing in a music
video qualified as fair use.150 Dereck Seltzer created a drawing entitled
Scream Icon in 2003,151 which he posted around Los Angeles as street art.152
Seltzer used the design to identify himself and licensed it for use in another
music video.153 Roger Staub, video designer for the band Green Day, created
backdrop videos for each of the 32 songs the band played on its 2009-2010
tour.154 In 2008, he took a photograph of a wall in Los Angeles, which
included Scream Icon.155 Staub used the photograph to create a modified
version of Scream Icon and included the new work in a four minute long
video for the song “East Jesus Nowhere.”156 Seltzer eventually learned of the
unauthorized use and filed a claim for copyright infringement, to which the
band asserted a fair use defense.157
The circuit court began its fair use analysis by stating that whether the
new work is transformative is a key factor, but that “is a[n] often highly
contentious topic,” citing the then-recent Cariou decision.158 The court did

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2004).
Seltzer v. Green Day Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1173; see infra Figure 9.
Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see infra Figure 10.
Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1175.
Id. at 1176.
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not follow the Second Circuit’s rationale and concluded that it should follow
the test set forth in Campbell.159 It then determined whether the new work
added a new expression, meaning, or message to the original.160 In order to
do this, the court examined each work and found that the message and
meaning of Scream Icon was debatable, even though it appeared to “be a
directionless anguished screaming face.”161 Although the ultimate meaning
behind the work was not decided, the court concluded that it did not have
anything to do with religion, while Staub’s video was “surrounded by
religious iconography,” accompanying a song “about the hypocrisy of
religion.”162 The court determined that the video backdrop conveyed “new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings,” as Seltzer
admitted during his deposition.163 With this in mind, the court concluded that
the new work was transformative.164
The Seltzer court then addressed the second fair use factor—the nature
of the copyrighted work—and determined that Scream Icon was a creative
work “meriting strong protection.”165 The court found that Seltzer’s work
was published, because it was widely disseminated on the Internet, as well
as the streets of Los Angeles.166 Published works are more likely to qualify
as fair use, because the first appearance of the artist’s expression has already
occurred.167 Therefore, the court determined that this factor weighed only
“slightly in Seltzer’s favor.”168
When analyzing the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, the Seltzer court
concluded that unlike a television show or book, Scream Icon was “not
meaningfully divisible.”169 The court noted that an alleged infringer would
not have this factor weighed against him or her, even if they copied the whole
work, if no more of the original work is taken than is necessary for the

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1177.
162. Id.
163. Id. During his deposition Seltzer stated that the backdrop “tainted the original message of the
image and [] made it now synonymous with lyrics, a video, and concert tour that it was not originally
intended to be used with.” Id. (omission theirs).
164. Id. at 1178.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
168. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178.
169. Id.
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intended use.170 The court concluded that in order for the new meaning of the
backdrop video to be achieved, the “use of the entire work was necessary.”171
The court ultimately concluded that the use of Scream Icon did not
deplete any market value for Seltzer, and that the fourth factor weighed in
favor of Green Day.172 Seltzer admitted that no one ever told him they would
not buy his work, because of the use of the image in the video. Instead, he
claimed “that Scream Icon was ‘tarnished’ for him personally.”173 Green Day
also presented evidence that the video backdrop did not provide the same
market function as the original, because it was never used for any marketing
purposes.174 Further, Seltzer did not provide any evidence of lost licensing
opportunities for the image, although he did state that it was used in a music
video by the band People. However, he did not provide any additional
information about a licensing agreement with People.175 The court found
these reasons were sufficient for it to conclude that the fourth factor did not
weigh against a finding of fair use.176
If the Davidovici case were to be brought in the Ninth Circuit, the court
would likely find that Koons’ work was a transformation. While this circuit
does not follow the Cariou rationale, which dictates that the secondary work
need not comment on the original, the judges would still be forced to provide
their own subjective views and determine the meaning behind both works.
They may split on the actual meanings behind the work or works, just as the
meaning of Scream Icon was not determined. However, the judges will use
their limited knowledge of the fine arts to determine the transformation of
Koons’ and Davidovici’s work. The court would look at the works side by
side, and determine their meanings based on subjective aesthetic judgments.
As the Seltzer court found the new work to be transformative, the same
would likely be found in Davidovici.
Looking at the nature of Davidovici’s photograph, the court would
conclude that it is an original work of authorship warranting the same amount
of protection as Seltzer’s Scream Icon. Additionally, the advertisement was
published, because it was used in a magazine. Therefore, the first appearance
of Davidovici’s expression already occurred. Thus, the court would

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id. at 1178–79.
Id. at 1179.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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determine that the photograph is a creative expression worthy of protection,
but would only weigh the factor slightly in favor of Davidovici.
The Seltzer court determined that the defendant’s copying was
necessary to achieve the alternate meaning behind the new work.177 The same
analysis would likely be applied in the Davidovici case, and the court would
determine that Koons’ taking from the original work was not more than
necessary, because it was needed to establish the new meaning of Koons’
work.
While the Seltzer court did not declare that the fourth factor should be
given substantial weight, it did seem to implicitly state that if Seltzer
provided more information about his licensing of Scream Icon, he might
have been able to sway the court in his favor, at least on the issue of the
fourth factor.178 If the Davidovici case were to be brought in this circuit,
Davidovici would be best served by bringing forth evidence about any
significant licensing opportunities he had concerning his original image, and
any diminution of value he may have incurred. While the Second Circuit did
not emphasize Cariou’s lost gallery opportunity, and easily divided the
markets of the two artists,179 the Ninth Circuit did not draw a significant
distinction between Green Day’s market and Seltzer’s market. If Davidovici
were to bring strong evidence of market diminution, it has the potential to be
a significant, and possibly dispositive factor in the court’s fair use analysis.
While the Ninth Circuit adamantly follows the Campbell precedent, and
the Second Circuit has further broadened the scope of fair use, the Seventh
Circuit refused to follow the transformative test altogether. In its recent
opinion, Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, this circuit cautioned against the
Second Circuit’s expansion of the fair use doctrine and called for a return to
the factors listed in the statute.180
D. The Seventh Circuit and Fair Use; The Statutory List Test
While the Second and Ninth Circuits would focus on the transformation
of Koons’ work, the Seventh Circuit would take an entirely different
approach. In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the court was asked to determine
if appropriating a photograph of a former mayor for use on a t-shirt was fair

177. Id. at 1178–79.
178. Id. at 1179 (“Seltzer provides no additional information about . . . licensing . . . [w]ithout further
context, this fact does not suffice to show that Green Day’s use harmed any existing market or a market
that Seltzer was likely to develop.”).
179. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2013).
180. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 2015 U.S.
LEXIS 1921; see infra Figure 11; see infra Figure 12.
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use.181 The court stated it was skeptical of the Second Circuit’s, and of
“Cariou’s approach, because asking exclusively whether something is
‘transformative’ not only replaces the list in § 107 [the four fair use factors]
but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).”182
The Kienitz court decided that it would not address transformative use
and that it was “best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most
important usually is the fourth (market effect).”183 Without bringing in
aesthetic judgments, such as determining the meaning of each work or
finding any transformation, the court quickly considered the purpose and
character of the new work.184 It determined that while the defendants did sell
their t-shirts for profit, they chose the design “as a form of political
commentary.”185 The judge stated the first factor did not “do much in this
case,”186 but concluded that the factor did weigh in favor of fair use.187
The court found the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
to be “unilluminating,”188 and did not give it significant analysis. After
analyzing the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work, the court determined the defendants had
not taken more than was necessary from the original photograph.189 The court
concluded that the defendants removed the colors, shading, and the original
background.190 Further, the lighting was significantly altered from the
original work, so that after all the changes, only the mayor’s smile remained
from the original work.191
Analyzing factor four—the effect on the market for the original work—
the court concluded that there was no effect, because the plaintiff admitted
that the defendant’s use did not disrupt any plan to license the photograph
for apparel, or that the use reduced demand for the original.192 However, at
the end of the majority opinion, Judge Easterbrook outlined an argument that
Kienitz could have made to persuade the court that the fourth factor should

181. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758; see infra Figure 11; see infra Figure 12.
182. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (reserving the exclusive right to the author to
“prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”).
183. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
184. Id. at 759.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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be weighed against a fair use finding.193 He stated that the use could injure
long-range commercial opportunities, despite the value of the particular
picture not being diminished.194 He posited a scenario where “[f]ewer people
will hire or cooperate with Kienitz if they think that the high quality of his
work will make the photos more effective when used against them!”195
If the Davidovici case were brought in this circuit, the court would not
consider the transformation test. Instead, it would look to the commercial
nature of Koons’ work. The commercial nature of the work is easily
identifiable, because Koons sells his statues. The court may additionally look
at any comments, if any, on the original work. Just as this factor proved to
be of little help in Kienitz, it would likely be of little help in Davidovici.
Therefore, the first fair use factor would not weigh significantly in favor of
either party.
The court would not dwell on the second factor—calling this factor
“unilluminating”196—and would instead move to the third factor, the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work.
Koons took significant parts of Davidovici’s photograph to create his work,
including: the pose of the woman lying in the snow, her facial expression,
and the pig at the top of her head with a barrel around its neck. All of these
elements are prominent in Koons’ work. The similarities between
Davidovici’s photograph and Koons’ sculpture are readily apparent, and this
court would likely not weigh this factor the same way as it did in Kienitz.197
Therefore, the Davidovici court would likely hold that Koons had taken far
more than was necessary in order to comment on the original
The fourth factor would be heavily discussed in the Seventh Circuit,
because the Kienitz court stated it is usually the most important factor.198
While it is not known whether Davidovici incurred any loss of licensing
opportunities or if the value of the original photograph diminished, he might
be able to prevail overall if he provided sufficient evidence of market harm,
because the market effect factor is heavily stressed in this circuit.
As demonstrated above, it is possible that there would be a finding of
fair use in Davidovici, but the Seventh Circuit would reach that conclusion
using an approach that differs from its sister circuits. Without the subjectivity
required in finding whether or not the new work is a transformation, the court
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 759–60.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 759–60.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 758.
Id.
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would analyze the four fair use factors in a more straightforward, and
efficient manner. Additionally, if Davidovici has suffered market harm from
Koons’ use, he may successfully argue that the fourth factor weighs in his
favor and ultimately succeed.
As this section has illustrated, the fair use doctrine is not applied in the
same manner throughout the circuits. Appropriation artists could have a
greater opportunity for a winning fair use defense if the circuit the suit takes
place in is favorable to them. Additionally, the transformative test requires
judges to make subjective interpretations about art in order to determine a
legal outcome. The next section will discuss a new approach to the fair use
test, and consider how attribution of copyrighted works will benefit fair use
analyses.
V. A NEW FAIR USE APPROACH
This section argues that the Seventh Circuit is correct in holding that
the transformative test should no longer be applied in appropriation art cases,
because it requires judges to act as critics. Courts should shift back to a more
straightforward four-factor analysis, and mostly focus on the fourth factor—
the market effect. While many courts are inclined to only consider the market
harm of a plaintiff, this section describes the need for the balancing of the
positive effect an appropriation artist can have on the market for another’s
work, against any market harm to the plaintiff. Additionally, this section will
consider what effect attributing the original copyright holder would have on
a fair use analysis.
A. No More Transformation
Requiring judges to determine transformation compels them to look to
the meaning of the artworks at issue, and requires them to determine what
the artists intended to create. That is exactly what the court did in Cariou
when the judges looked at the artworks and photographs side-by-side and
determined that Prince’s work gave “a different character . . . new
expression[] and employ[ed] new aesthetics with creative and
communicative results distinct from Cariou’s.”199 In a dissenting opinion,
Judge Wallace quoted the words of Justice Holmes from the Bleistein
opinion and stated “I, for one, do not believe that I am in a position to make

199.

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2013).
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these fact-and-opinion-intensive decisions.”200 He came to this conclusion,
in part, because of his “limited art experience.”201
A number of scholars agree that because of the emphasis placed on
transformation when analyzing fair use, judges critique art in direct contrast
to a century old precedent.202 Doing away with the transformation sub-factor
will eliminate this obligation for judges and end its domination of the fair
use analysis. This will lead to more consistency among fair use decisions,
because they will not be contingent upon judge’s personal subjective views
of the works at issue. Specifically, in appropriation art cases, judges will not
be forced to determine the meaning of the works at issue and allow that to
be the driving force behind their decisions.
While the transformative nature of the secondary work should be
abandoned in appropriation art cases, courts should continue to look to other
comments or critiques of the original work. Moreover, courts should
additionally consider the purpose of the use or why the artist chose to use the
original as source material. The precedent set forth in Cariou allows
appropriation artists to use works with minimal limits and allows for minimal
analysis of the purpose and character of the use, the original considerations
of the first statutory factor.
B. Putting the Emphasis on the Fourth Factor
With the focus no longer on whether the second work is a
transformation, a judge will not act as a critic to determine a finding of fair
use in appropriation art cases. Additionally, plaintiffs like Patrick Cariou,
Dereck Seltzer, and Michael Kienitz will be able to bring potentially
compelling arguments concerning market effect, arguments that helped Art
Rogers succeed in his case. Plaintiffs will additionally be able to bring strong
and potentially decisive arguments similar to what Judge Easterbrook laid
out at the end of the Kienitz decision.203
While plaintiffs, such as Dereck Seltzer, may object to the use of their
work in appropriation art on moral grounds,204 those arguments will not
200. Id. at 714
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Brittani Everson, The Narrowest and Most Obvious Limits: Applying Fair Use to
Appropriation Art Economically Using a Royalty System, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 729 (2014); Arjun Gupta,
“I’ll Be Your Mirror”—Contemporary Art and the Role of Style in Infringement Analysis, 31 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 45 (2005); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247
(1998).
203. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759–60.
204. Seltzer v. Green Day Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013) (claiming that “Scream Icon
was tarnished for [Seltzer] personally”).
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compel a court to a finding of a non-fair use, because moral rights in the
United States are limited.205 Moral rights only apply to visual artists who
create a limited amount of works, and provide artists with the opportunity to
have their names applied to or withheld from a work of visual art, prevent
distortion or mutilation of a work, as well as prevent the destruction of a
work of recognized stature.206 However, a focus on the fourth factor will
allow a plaintiff to strategically and effectively argue against an
appropriation when sharing Seltzer’s sentiment.
Had the focus been on the fourth factor in prior cases, perhaps the
plaintiffs in Blanch, Seltzer, and Kienitz would have provided more evidence
of lost licensing opportunities or other negative effects on the market demand
of their works. Instead, those cases focused on the transformative nature of
the secondary work. Rather, as Judge Easterbrook suggested in Kienitz,
plaintiffs should highlight how long-range commercial opportunities are
affected when their work is used against them.207
While an emphasis should be placed on the fourth factor, it is important
for courts to not allow a plaintiff to claim that a second artist’s use of their
material depleted the market that he or she had not already developed, or a
market the plaintiff is unlikely to develop in the future. While some courts
have held that it is the original copyright holders’ right to enter or not enter
certain markets,208 a copyright holder who suffers no market harm—either in
current markets or in markets they do not intend to develop—is not
economically burdened by secondary use. Therefore, courts should be wary
not to weigh the fourth factor in favor of a would-be infringer if the original
artist cannot show he or she faced harm in relevant markets that are likely to
be entered. Rather, a court could place a burden on the original artist with a
standard such as preponderance of the evidence that he or she would likely
enter into a market that the secondary user has usurped.
A shift back to the fourth factor as usually being the most important
should yield the aforementioned positive results, but it cannot be the only
consideration. While appropriation art challenges the boundaries of
205. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
206. Id.
207. See Kienitz, 766 F.3d, at 759–60.
208. See Castle Rock Ent. v. Carol Pub. Group, 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a
trivia book based on the television show Seinfeld was not fair use: “[a]lthough Castle Rock has evidenced
little if any interest in exploiting . . . derivative works based on Seinfeld[,] . . . the copyright law must
respect that creative and economic choice”); see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99
(2d Cir. 1987) (stating in its factor four analysis that “the proper inquiry concerns the ‘potential market’
for the copyrighted work . . . [an author] is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his [copyrighted
material]”) (emphasis in original) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012); Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan,
744 F.2d 1490, 1496–97 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985)).
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copyright law, it is a respected form of art, and should not be stifled.
Appropriation artists that do not infringe others’ work are providing more
creative work for the world, and therefore, are fulfilling the directive of the
intellectual property clause of the Constitution to “promote the progress
of . . . useful works.”209 Under the proposed legal framework, appropriation
artists could counter plaintiffs’ potential negative market effects arguments
by showing how the use of the original work improved market demand for
that work. A court, looking at the effect on the market for the original work
in totality, or the net market effect of both negative and positive effects to
the market, could then determine whether a secondary use was a fair use or
not.
C. Market Harm Balanced Against Market Help
The language of the fourth statutory factor states that a court shall
examine, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”210 Nowhere does it state that courts must only look at any
market harm a plaintiff has suffered. However, after Campbell, “market
harm” has become the most common way to refer to the fourth factor.211
While some courts have not followed this commonality,212 some scholars
have begun exploring net market effects that include any market help by
unauthorized use in addition to market harm.213
Alternatively, “market help” has been described as the
“underappreciated role of the economic upside of unauthorized use for
owners”214 by a secondary work. This would be an appropriation artist’s ideal
argument. Economic loss suffered by the original copyright owner must be
balanced against any economic gain; one example was noted in Judge
Leval’s famous Toward a Fair Use Standard.215 An appropriation artist, such
209. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (stating that Congress shall have the power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
210. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (emphasis added).
211. David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 359, 366
n.28 (2014) (string-citing cases associating the fourth factor with the degree of market harm by
defendant’s unauthorized use).
212. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[A] reasonable
factfinder could only find that Google Books enhances the sales of books to the benefit of copyright
holders.”); Faulkner Literary Rts. v. Sony Pictures Classics, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 711 (N.D. Miss.
2013) (“[T]hat the [secondary work] indeed helped the plaintiff and the market value of [the original
work] if it had any effect at all.”).
213. See Fagundes, supra note 211, at 377–78.
214. Id. at 361.
215. Leval, supra note 45, at 1124 (“An unjustified taking that enhances the market for the
copyrighted work is easy to imagine. If, for example, a film director takes an unknown copyrighted tune
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as Richard Prince or Jeff Koons, has the potential to use another’s work to
create their own revenue stream, and increase the demand for the original
work. These artists attract athletes, musicians, and other famous individuals
who pay high prices for their pieces.216 These consumers may want to buy
the original work as well. Thus, a piece of art that had little-to-no success
may enjoy an increase in demand through secondary use.217
However, while a popular appropriation artist may be able to bring
another artist to the limelight quickly and increase demand, this is only one
aspect of the market that needs to be addressed. Licensing is an important
aspect of generating revenue from creative works. In each case mentioned
herein, the courts discussed licensing opportunities.218 The original artist may
argue that while demand in sales for their work has gone up, they also
inherently lost revenue and a market opportunity because the secondary artist
did not pay any licensing fee.219 Moreover, courts are not only to look at the
market of a work at the time of a suit, but must also look to the potential
effect on the market a secondary use may have.220 Therefore, it is necessary
for courts to look to the potential for future lost revenue, such as the lost
opportunities to license a work, which the original artist may suffer. This
must be balanced against any positive effect on the market the secondary use
may have had.
Courts should look to the overall market effect of the original work and
not solely examine market harm. While it is possible that an appropriation
artist can bolster market demand of another artist’s work, it would be
difficult to do if consumers cannot find out who the original artist is.
for the score of a movie that becomes a hit, the composer may realize a windfall from the aftermarket for
his composition.”).
216. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2013) (“Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold
for two million or more dollars. The invitation list for a dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with
the opening of the Canal Zone show included a number of the wealthy and famous such as . . . Jay-Z and
Beyonce[,] . . . Tom Brady[,] . . . Robert DeNiro, Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt.”).
217. Fagundes, supra note 211, at 381 (“[W]hen Shepard Fairey used one of Garcia’s photos of
Barack Obama to make Fairey’s iconic ‘Hope’ poster, it was a boon to Garcia as well as to Fairey (and
to Obama). Thanks to the affirming effect of Fairey’s unauthorized use, Garcia had a show of his Obama
photo at a swanky Chelsea art gallery in 2009, where prints of Garcia’s work went for a cool $1,200
apiece.”).
218. See Cariou, 714.3d at 699; Seltzer v. Green Day Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013);
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2004); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
219. Gilbert, supra note 9 (“Koons hasn’t stopped using copyrighted material but now gets licences
(sic) first—his ‘Popeye’ series, shown in 2009 at London’s Serpentine Gallery, is just one example.
[Koons’ attorney] says that although responses to Koons’ requests vary, ‘hordes of people’ have granted
permissions, including United Feature Syndicate, which had earlier sued him, and Marvel Comics.”).
220. Harper & Row, Pubs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (“[T]o negate fair use one
need only show that if the challenged use ‘should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984)).
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However, appropriation artists should provide attribution to the original
artist in order to make them known to consumers and to bolster a fair use
defense.
D. Encouraging Appropriation Artists to Attribute Original Authors
Applying a “market help” analysis to Cariou, Fagundes observed the
Second Circuit’s implication “that the publicity generated by Prince’s
infringement could only have helped the commercial success of Cariou’s
book.”221 While such a holding is possible, two factors stand in the way. First,
in its analysis of the fourth factor, the Cariou court split the markets that
Patrick Cariou and Richard Prince appealed to, stating that the former’s work
would not appeal to the latter’s. 222 Second, fans of Prince’s work could not
know he used Cariou’s photographs if they were not already familiar with
Cariou’s work, since Prince provided no attribution to the original work.
The Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”), codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A,
provides that an author of a work of visual art shall have the right to “claim
authorship of that work.”223 However, the statute begins by stating that the
rights are subject to section 107,224 the fair use doctrine. While the majority
of Prince’s work was considered to be a transformation by the Second Circuit
and thus protected by fair use,225 he had no mandate under VARA to give
Cariou any attribution for the use of his photographs. Unless one was already
familiar with Cariou’s photographs, one would not know to look for them or
any of his other works after viewing Prince’s artwork. Additionally, without
attribution, viewers of Prince’s work would not know which parts of his
artwork were appropriated, and which parts were not,226 leading a viewer to
believe that perhaps the entire work was Prince’s. This is similar to a music
listener’s mistaken belief that a “cover” is the original version of a song.227
Therefore any “market help” to Cariou would be slim, because as the Second

221. Fagundes, supra note 211, at 383.
222. 714 F.3d 694 at 709 (“Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s.”).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2012).
224. Id.
225. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2013).
226. Vartanian, supra note 1 (tweeting a photo of the exhibition along with the caption
“Appropriated Exhibit. The only way you’d know my work was a part of this display is . . . well, that’s
just it, you wouldn’t know. #PrinceofAppropriation.”).
227. See Jordan Runtagh, Cover Me: 20 Famous Songs You Had No Idea Were Covers, VH1 MUSIC,
(Apr. 18, 2013) http://www.vh1.com/music/tuner/2013-04-18/cover-me-20-famous-songs-you-had-noidea-were-covers/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
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Circuit noted, “Prince’s work appeals to an entirely different sort of collector
than Cariou’s.”228
If appropriation artists attributed the works they use to their original
copyright holders, there would likely be more evidence that the use bolstered
the market for the original. However, Cariou would not have benefitted from
“market help,” because Prince was not obligated to inform his audience that
he used Cariou’s photographs.
Attribution is now being encouraged among younger waves of artists.
The College Art Association, whose mission is to promote the visual arts and
their understanding, states that when copying another’s work, an artist
should cite the source.229 Additionally, artists themselves seek attribution,
such as Donald Graham whose photograph was used in Richard Prince’s
recent exhibition.230 Graham clearly wanted his work to be attributed when
he specifically posted about Prince’s work on social media.231 Other
organizations that encourage a radical overhaul to our copyright system232
still encourage attribution to source materials.233 Market help arguments are
therefore derived from attribution, counter market harm, and lost licensing
arguments.
Attribution also plays into analyzing the first factor of fair use, “the
purpose and character of the use.”234 Without looking to whether the new
work is a transformation, attribution allows courts to determine whether the
original art was used in good faith, because “propriety of the defendant’s
conduct” is relevant to the character of the use.235 Fair use “presupposes
‘good faith and fair dealing,’”236 and when the defendant’s conduct has been

228. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
229. Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for the Visual Arts, COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION 11, (Feb.
2015), www.collegart.org/pdf/fair-use/best-practices-fair-use-visual-arts.pdf.
230. Vartanian, supra note 1. Donald Graham’s Rastafarian Smoking a Joint, Jamaica was uploaded
to Instagram by a third party and Prince used the photo in his New Portraits exhibit without permission
or attributing Graham. Id.
231. Id. (posting on Donald Graham’s Instagram account saying “How to credit a work: ‘Rastafarian
Smoking a Joint’ © 1997 Donald Graham”).
232. QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG, http://questioncopyright.org/about (last visited Mar. 28, 2015)
(stating that QuestionCopyright.org’s mission is “to provide advocacy and practical education to help
cultural producers embrace open distribution”).
233. QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG, http://questioncopyright.org/minute_memes. The organization
created a series of videos called “minute memes,” which address and question certain aspects of current
copyright law. Id. One of the videos, entitled “Credit is Due (The Attribution Song),” encourages artists
to always attribute the original author when using their work. Id.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
235. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][d], n.121
(Matthew Bender, ed.) (string-citing cases stating this principle).
236. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quoting Schulman,
Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968)).
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found to be in bad faith, it tips the scales of the first factor in favor of a nonfair use.237 Attribution to the original author provides additional evidence that
the appropriation artist acts in good faith. Weighed with the other factors in
light of the purpose of copyright, attribution could be beneficial under both
the first and the fourth fair use factors.238
A reversion to the fourth factor as being usually “the most important”239
will prevent judges from interpreting art with their own subjective views. It
will also allow appropriation artists to argue “market help” within a fair use
analysis. The fair use test should heavily stress the fourth factor, so that
courts can consider the net effects of an allegedly infringing use on markets
for the original work. The fourth factor should also be heavily stressed so
that appropriation artists can support a fair use defense while judges leave
their personal views on art in their chambers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have continued to expand the fair use doctrine ever since
Campbell used the transformation test as a nearly dispositive fair use
analysis. The transformative test requires judges to find meanings in works
of art by comparing them side-by-side, applying their own views, and
making determinations with little-to-no fine arts experience. Conversely, the
statutory factors, which do not mention transformation, are weighed in light
of each other. An emphasis on the statutory list does not require judges to
make subjective, uninformed decisions. Additionally, attribution to
copyrighted works provides for a good faith defense against a market harm
argument under the fourth factor of fair use by rebutting any market harm
arguments with a market help argument. The Supreme Court should no
longer require an examination of whether the new work is a transformation
in appropriation art cases. Instead, it should provide guidance to the lower
courts about how to objectively and effectively apply the four statutory
factors.
There is no statutory requirement for appropriation artists to give
attribution. Requiring one would impose a burden to make a formal

237. See Harper & Row, Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The Nation
knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript . . . [u]nlike the typical claim for fair use, The Nation cannot
offer up even the fiction of consent as justification.”). Cf. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d
18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[G]ood faith also weighs in . . . favor [of the first] prong of the fair use test. . . .
Although acknowledgement does not excuse infringement, the failure to acknowledge counts against the
infringer.”).
238. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
239. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, 766 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2014).
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requirement. However, Congress could amend the statute to encourage
artists to give attribution by allowing market help arguments when there has
been attribution, and not assigning significant weight to those arguments
when there has been none. Focusing on the fourth factor will allow plaintiffs
to bring infringement actions without fearing what a judge will think of the
artworks in question, and allow appropriation artists to have more
compelling arguments when considering overall market effect.

